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This paper considers any evolutionary game possessing several evolutionarily stable 
strategies,  or  ESSs,  with  differing  payoffs.  A  mutant  is  introduced  which  will 
"destroy" any ESS which yields a lower payoff than another. This mutant possesses 
a costless signal and also conditions on the presence of this signal in each opponent. 
The mutant then can protect itself against a population playing an inefficient  ESS 
by matching this  against these  non-signalers.  At the  same time, the mutants can 
achieve the more efficient  ESS against the signaling mutant population itself. This 
construction is illustrated by means of the simplest possible example, a co-ordination 
game. The one-shot prisoner's dilemma is used to illustrate how a superior outcome 
which is not induced by an ESS may be temporarily but not permanently attained. 
In the case of the repeated prisoner's dilemma, the present argument seems to render 
the "evolution of co-operation" ultimately inevitable. 
I.  Introduction 
The  title  "The  Origin of Species"  seems  to  suggest,  at  least  to  the  unwary,  that 
Darwin intended a group to be the unit of selection. The subtitle of Darwin's treatise 
reinforces this casual impression--".., or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the 
Struggle for Life". However, Darwin explicitly recognized that "the struggle for life 
(is) most severe between  individuals  and varieties of the same species", (Darwin, 
1859;  Mayr,  1982: 484-485,  attributes  Darwin's  recognition  of the  importance of 
intra-species competition to his reading of Malthus, 1798, but see also pp. 491-493). 
It is  still  not uncommon  to  hear  popular  explanations  of animal  behavior which 
rely upon an appeal to the interest of a species or, occasionally, even to the collective 
interest  of several.  A  few  modern  biologists  believe  that  there  exist  phenomena 
which cannot be explained without invoking a group selection mechanism (see e.g. 
Wynne-Edwards,  1962).  Most other modern biologists, on the other hand, seem to 
find such explanations to be unattractive in the light of the logic of natural selection. 
Dawkins,  (1976: 8-9),  for  example,  argues  that  natural  selection  operates  most 
forcefully below the level of the group and, far from promoting the interest of the 
group, might entail its extinction.  Indeed, Dawkins argues that the unit of selection 
is,  in  a  certain  sense,  below even the  level of the  individual,  is the  gene  (see,  in 
particular Dawkins,  1982a: 45-64). 
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Views of evolutionary biology which emphasize the role of the individual are, of 
course, highly congenial to economists. Further strengthening both the formal and 
substantive links between the two disciplines is that game theory has now also been 
applied to evolutionary biology (see Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Maynard Smith, 
1982).  Consider the interactions of the  individuals  of one particular species with 
one  another.  Suppose  that  these  interactions  involve  two  individuals  at  a  time 
contesting some scarce resource, such as food. With a large population, the equili- 
brium outcome introduced by Maynard Smith & Price is a special kind of symmetric 
Nash equilibrium, involving what is designated an "evolutionarily stable strategy", 
or ESS. A  population playing such a  strategy is immune to invasion by a  mutant 
population playing any alternative strategy. It need not be the case, of course, that 
such  an  ESS is unique,  and  indeed  ESSs may have different payoffs. That is,  an 
ESS can  exist which  yields an  outcome which  is  inferior to that  obtained  under 
some other ESS. Such a situation has a well-known analog within pure game theory. 
That is, it is often possible to Pareto rank some of the Nash  equilibria of a game. 
A long-standing problem is how to construct a theory which predicts Pareto-efficiency 
within the set of Nash equilibria. 
The intention of the present work is to suggest that "Mother Nature" might be 
less baffied by this problem than are game theorists. For there is a simple mechanism, 
based on the individual as the unit of selection, whereby such inefficient ESSs can 
be destroyed. That is, a  mutation can be defined which will successfully invade a 
population which is playing any ESS which is payoff-dominated by another. This 
mutation must, of necessity, involve more than simply a  different choice from the 
original set of strategies, for it is just these latter mutants which are considered in 
the definition of an ESS. Indeed, the mutation here entails the possession of a signal, 
that is, an observable characteristic which can be taken to have zero inherent cost. 
Mutants recognize the presence or absence of this signal in the other individual and 
condition their choice of strategy on this. 
It should be emphasized that there is little doubt that animals actually use signals, 
for certain  purposes  at  least.  Thus,  for  example,  Maynard  Smith  (1982: 82-86) 
discusses the Harris sparrow, individuals of which vary in the color of their plumage 
and  also  in  aggression  towards  other  birds,  with  the  darker  birds  being  more 
aggressive.  Dark  birds  painted  pale  continued  to  behave  aggressively  but  were 
involved in  a  larger number of fights than  normal  dark birds.  Pale birds  painted 
dark tended to be persecuted by normal dark birds and were sometimes forced to 
feed away from the flock. It is not asserted that this will precisely fit the model here. 
What it does demonstrate is the reality of signaling as a natural phenomenon. 
Consider then a  population for some evolutionary game which is in a  low-level 
trap, that is an ESS which is inferior to another ESS. The appropriate mutant uses 
the kind of signal discussed above as follows. Against the old non-signaling popula- 
tion the mutant plays the old inefficient EES, thus protecting itself from the con- 
sequences that would otherwise occur. On  the other hand,  mutants  recognize the 
signal in other mutants  and then can attain the more efficient ESS.  It is assumed 
that the old non-signaling population remains blind to the signal.  (This motivates 
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is without loss of generality in the sense that it is not- possible for non-signalers to 
do  better than  by playing the  old  ESS  against  such  mutants,  given the  mutants' 
behavior.) 
The argument  can  better be  understood  with  the  aid  of the  simplest  possible 
example, an evolutionary game with two pure strategies, each of which is an ESS. 
This is presented in section 3.1. The effect of the mutation  is to add  a  third pure 
strategy which plays the inferior strategy against either of the original two strategies 
and the superior strategy against itself. Thus the entries in the new 3 x 3 matrix are 
derived in a  straightforward way from those in the original 2 x 2 matrix.  It is then 
readily shown  that the  only ESSs now are the  old superior strategy and  the new 
mutant strategy, which are equivalent in payoffs. Furthermore, it is shown that the 
population must converge to one of these equivalent ESSs, given a  generic initial 
point, under the pure-strategy dynamic.  Initial  points near the original  inefficient 
ESS converge in particular to the new efficient mutant ESS. 
The  analysis  of the  above  example  suggests  that  a  similar  mutant  would  be 
successful in invading a population playing some ESS if only there exists an outcome 
yielding a  superior payoff. That is, the argument  does not appear to use directly 
the assumption that the superior outcome be itself an ESS. In order to discuss this 
issue, the one-shot "prisoner's dilemma" is presented as a second example, in section 
3.2.  It is  noted firstly that,  indeed,  the  addition  of an  appropriate  mutant  to the 
standard 2 x 2 prisoner's dilemma game results in a  3 x 3 game in which the group 
preferred "co-operative" outcome is generated by the unique  ESS.  Even if this is 
credible as a short-run outcome, there is an obvious objection to this in the long-run. 
That is, there is another mutant waiting impatiently in the wings, a  mutant which 
avails itself of the signal and plays the old "rink" ESS against the old population, 
but also "finks" against the first mutant. This second mutant thus "'finks" uncondi- 
tionally.  It  is  desirable,  then,  to consider the 4x 4  game  with  both  mutants.  It is 
noted  firstly  that  this  4x4  game  does  not,  strictly  speaking,  possess  any  ESS. 
However, this  is  simply  a  technicality rather than  a  deep  difficulty. It  is  shown, 
indeed,  that  the  path  of the  population  over time  generally  converges  to  some 
mixture between the old "rink" strategy and the mutant which signals but "finks" 
always anyway, under the pure strategy dynamic. The limiting payoff is uniquely 
determined, in general, as the usual payoff for the 2 x 2 game.  In essence then, the 
conventional equilibrium prediction for the prisoner's dilemma is ultimately restored. 
The next section defines the notion of an ESS and the dynamical systems. Section 
3,  as  noted  above, discusses  two  key examples.  Section 4  discusses  related  work 
and the implications of the present results. The Appendix shows how the analysis 
of the first example can be generalized whenever there are at least two ESSs with 
differing payoffs. 
2.  Definitions 
The description of the game and motivation of the ESS definition follow Hines 
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Definition  1:  Basic evolutionary game 
There is a large (strictly infinite) population of individuals who interact two at a 
time.  (Riley,  1979,  discusses  the  complications  needed  in  order  to  analyze small 
populations).  In each interaction,  each  individual  has pure strategies  i =  1,...,  n. 
These  yield  the  associated  mixed  strategies  denoted  by  x,  say,  where  xi->0  and 
n 
Y-i~l xi =  1 and so x ~ A  n-I, the (n-  1) simplex in R n. If a given individual chooses 
pure strategy i  and his opponent chooses j, the payoff to the first individual  is a U. 
The payoff to the second individual, given symmetry between the two individuals, 
is therefore aji. (These payoffs measure "fitness" in the biological sense of determin- 
ing the  number of descendants,  as  is  modeled  explicitly in  the  dynamics below.) 
This symmetry between  individuals  means that it is enough to specify A = (alj), a 
single  n x n  matrix. 
The  payoff to  choice  of mixed  strategy  x  against  a  mixed  strategy  x*  is  then 
readily seen to be: 
xrAx *. 
The  requirements  for  an  ESS  can  then  be  motivated  as  follows.  Consider  a 
"'monomorphic" population  every member of which  plays the mixed strategy x*. 
This is to be resistant to invasion by a monomorphic mutant playing any alternative 
mixed strategy x, say. Suppose indeed that the fraction ( 1 -  e) of the total population 
plays x*  and  the  fraction  e  plays x,  where  each  opponent  is  randomly selected. 
Effectively, then,  each individual  faces the  mixed strategy (1- e)x*+ex,  where  e 
is small. The payoff to x* is then; 
x* rA[(1 -  e)x* + ex] = (1 -  e)x* tAx* + ex* tAx, 
whereas the payoff to x  is; 
xrA[(1 -  e)x* + ex] = (1 -  e)xT Ax* + exr Ax. 
This suggests the following, as in  Maynard Smith  (1982): 
Definition  2:  Evolutionarily stable strategy,  ESS 
An ESS is x'cA  n-~ such that, for all x~A ~-~, where x~x*,  either; 
(i)  xrAx* < x'tAx* 
or 
(ii)  xrAx *=x-tAx  *  and  xrAx<x*rAx. 
The above conditions can be paraphrased in game theoretic terms as follows.  It is 
required  that the  strategy x* be a  best-reply to itself and,  further,  that  any other 
best-reply to x*, x, say, be a worse reply to x  than is x*. In particular, then, an ESS 
yields  a  symmetric Nash  equilibrium.  Not  every symmetric mixed  strategy  Nash 
equilibrium  induces an  ESS, however, as taking A  to be a  matrix of zeroes shows. 
Indeed, this also shows an ESS need not exist. 
If each individual were restricted to the use of the pure strategies i =  1, 2 .... , the 
vector x*~ A ~-~  can  then  be  reinterpreted  as  the  distribution  of a  polymorphic 
population  over these  pure  strategies.  If x*  is  an  ESS  as  above, its  immunity to EFFICIENCY  IN  EVOLUTIONARY  GAMES  383 
invasion by any mixed strategy mutant implies immunity, in particular, to any pure 
strategy mutant.  However, it  is  not  true  that  immunity to  invasion  by any  pure 
strategy mutant implies x* is an ESS (see Maynard Smith,  1982: 185). 
For some purposes it is useful to consider not only an appropriate static equili- 
brium  concept, as above, but the evolution of the population over time. The first 
specifications of dynamics were based on pure strategies (see e.g. Taylor & Jonker, 
1978; Zeeman, 1979). For simplicity of exposition, the present paper will also confine 
attention to such pure strategy dynamics. They are given as: 
Definition  3:  Pure strategy dynamics 
The fraction of the population playing a particular pure strategy is taken to evolve 
according to the difference between the "fitness" of this pure strategy and the average 





Yci = xi[(Ax)i--xTAx],  i= 1,...,  n, 
where the r.h.s, is cubic in x. Clearly, if x~ = 0, for any i, at t -- 0, then x~ = 0 always. 
Furthermore, it is easily seen that every solution path remains on the unit simplex, 
given that it starts there. Hence the dimensionality of the system is n -  1 rather than n. 
A point x* ~ A ~-1 is said to be a "point attractor" if it is the limit of the solution 
path  of the  dynamical  system  for all  initial  values  in  some  neighborhood of x*. 
Zeeman (1979) shows that any ESS must be a  point attractor for the pure strategy 
dynamic, but also gives an example of a  point attractor which is not an ESS. 
It should be noted, however, that it is, in some ways, more mathematically complete 
to allow mixed strategies throughout. Thus Hines (1980, 1987) obtains the following: 
Definition  4:  Mixed strategy dynamics 
Suppose that the distribution of the population over mixed strategies is given by 
the probability measure  F  on Borel subsets  of A  "-~.  Define then the mean mixed 
strategy as; 
/z = J  x dF(x), 
and the associated covariance matrix as; 
C= f  (x- p.)(x-/x) r  dF(x). 
If x* ~ Int A n-~ is a  fixed point, Hines (1980)  shows that the appropriate mixed 
strategy dynamic satisfies; 
d 
dt (/z -  x*) = CA(/z -  x*). 384  A.J.  ROBSON 
Hines can then show that x*~ Int A n-t  is  always a  "sink"  for the mixed strategy 
dynamic system for/z if and only if x* is an  ESS as above. (To be a  sink here is 
to require the eigenvalues of CA, suitably restricted, all to have negative real parts. 
This  is  to  hold  for all  appropriate  C).  Note that  convergence of/~-x*  does  not 
imply  that  the  limiting  distribution  itself  is  uniquely  determined  (see  Hines, 
1987: 208, for further complications). 
Altogether, then, the definition of an ESS is most readily understood in terms of 
mixed strategies. Furthermore, being an ESS is, in a sense, necessary and sufficient 
for the stability of the mixed strategy dynamic. On the other hand, whereas being 
an ESS is sufficient to be immune to invasion by any pure strategy, it is not necessary. 
Again, being an  ESS is sufficient to be an attractor of the pure strategy dynamic, 
but it is not necessary. 
3.  Two Key Examples 
3.1. A CO-ORDINATION GAME 
This is, it seems, the simplest possible game yielding two ESSs which have different 
payoffs. It is given in Fig.  1. 
u  d 
u  1  0 
d  0  2 
FIG.  1.  A  co-ordination  game. 
It is clear that both "u" and "d" are ESSs and it is not difficult to see that there 
is no other ESS (this follows also from Bishop & Cannings,  1978: 91). Clearly the 
ESS "d", which yields a  payoff of 2, is better for the population as a  whole than 
is "u", which yields only a payoff of 1. Notice however that "u" is certainly immune 
to  invasion  by a  small  group  of mutants  playing  "d".  Indeed,  suppose  that  the 
mutant  "d"  comprises  a  fraction  e  of the  total  population  with  the  remaining 
fraction (1- e) being still "u". In this case, each mutant obtains an average payoff 
of 2e against the whole population, whereas the original "u" strategy yields (1 -  e). 
Thus the mutant will die out if e <  1/3. 
Now suppose that the mutation discussed in the introduction is introduced. This 
mutant carries a  signal which is assumed to cost nothing to produce. Furthermore 
the mutant recognizes the presence of the signal in its opponent and conditions its 
choice of strategy  on  this.  Suppose  that  the  mutant  here  plays  "u"  against  the 
non-signaling  original  population but plays  "d"  against  other signaling  mutants. 
The effect of this is to enlarge the original 2 x 2 game to the 3 x 3 game given in Fig. 2. 
In Fig. 2, the mutant signaling strategy is labeled "m". It should be emphasized 
that this enlarged 3 x 3 game still has just  "u" and  "d"  as its underlying choices EFFICIENCY  IN  EVOLUTIONARY  GAMES  385 
u  d  m 
u  1  0  I 
d  0  2  0 
m  1  0  2 
FIG. 2.  The co-ordination game  with a  signaling mutant. 
and that the payoff consequences of a  given pair of these underlying choices are 
also as in the 2 x 2 game. 
It is easy to check that "u" is no longer an ESS, although (u, u) remains a  Nash 
equilibrium. That is, "'m" is also a  best reply to "u" but "m" does better against 
itself than "u" does against "m". The only ESSs are now easily seen to be "d" and 
In  order to  more  fully characterize the  behavior of the  population  with  these 
three  strategies,  the  appropriate  pure  strategy  dynamic system  derived  from  the 
above matrix, A, is treated. This is: 
--=x~+x3--  W 
X1 
x2 =  2x2 -  W 
X2 
x3 
-  xt +2x3-  W, 
X3 
where,  x~,  x2,  and  x3 are the components of the vector x, corresponding to "u", 
"d"  and "rn" respectively, and where, 
W = xl (xl + x3) + 2x~ + x3(xl + 2x3), 
now denotes the  average fitness of the  entire population.  Using  the  relation that 
x~ = (1- x2-x3) to eliminate xl and simplifying yields the following equations for 
x2  and x3: 
"~  2  Yc_.~2 =  -1  + 4x2 -  3x~ -  x3 
x2 
Yc3  2  2 
--=  X2 + X3-- 3X2-- X3. 
X3 
The phase diagram for these equations is readily derived and is sketched in Fig. 3. 
(When there are two dimensions it is not possible for exotic behavior such as "chaos" 
to arise). 
This diagram  shows that generic initial  points with strictly positive amounts of 
all three strategies have solution paths which tend to either "d" or "m", and there 386  A.J.  ROBSON 
2 
W=2 
:o  X--x3-- o 
, 
w=a  g  g 
x2 
FIG. 3.  Phase diagram for the co-ordination game with a mutant. 
is a  limiting payoff of 2 in all cases. All such initial points near "u" have solution 
paths which tend to "m" in particular. That is, the old inefficient ESS at "u" has, 
in this sense, been supplanted by a new efficient ESS at "m". Further, this new ESS 
is clearly immune to the introduction of the further mutant which signals but plays 
"u" against other signalers. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  above  process  is  not  reversible.  That  is,  suppose 
instead  the  mutant  plays  the  efficient  ESS  against  non-signalers  and  plays  the 
inefficient  ESS against fellow signalers. It is easily shown that "u" and "d" remain 
the only ESSs of this augmented game. Hence "d", in particular, is not destroyed 
as an ESS by the introduction of this mutant. Such a mutant can indeed be shown 
to die out. 
3.2. THE ONE-SHOT PRISONER'S DILEMMA 
This game is given as Fig. 4. In this case it is easily seen that the unique ESS is 
"u", which yields a  payoff of 2, despite the possibility of obtaining 3 by means of EFFICIENCY  IN  EVOLUTIONARY  GAMES  387 
u  d 
u  2  4 
d  1  3 
FIG. 4.  One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma. 
the  entire  population playing "d". The analysis of the previous example suggests 
that a mutant playing "u" against the old population and "d" against itself will be 
able to successfully invade a  population playing "u".  Indeed, consider Fig. 5. 
The only ESS now is easily seen to be "'m', which entails the payoff of 3.  If this 
u  d  m 
u  2  4  2 
d  1  3  1 
m  2  4  3 
FIG. 5.  One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma with mutant. 
mutant and only this mutant were introduced, there is no reason to doubt the merit 
of this  ESS.  The  difficulty  is  just  that  such  an  ESS  is  a  "sitting  duck"  for  the 
introduction of still another mutant, one which would prey on the first mutant. The 
second mutant should carry the signal, but play "u" against the first mutant as well 
as  against  the  non-signaling population.  (It  would seem  that  this  second mutant 
could evolve relatively easily from the  first since all  it involves is  a  switch  in the 
underlying choice to be  played against other signalers).  With the introduction of 
the second mutant in addition to the first the game is as in Fig. 6. 
In  Fig.  6, the  second mutant  is  labeled  "f'.  It is  not hard to see that there  are 
now no ESSs,  and  hence the  dynamical system associated  with this  matrix  needs 
to be analyzed directly. This is  a  three-dimensional system on the tetrahedron, A  3. 
In general, three-dimensional  systems can have markedly more complex behavior 
than that possible in two dimensions. However, the present example is rather simple. 
Notice,  in  fact, that the  strategy "d"  is  unambiguously "dominated" not just  by 
u  d  m  f 
u  2  4  2  2 
d  1  3  1  1 
m  2  4  3  1 
f  2  4  4  2 
FIG. 6.  One-shot Prisoner's Dilemma with two mutants. 388  A.J.  ROBSON 
one of the other strategies but by all of them.  (A strategy is said to be dominated 
by another strategy if it yields no more payoff for every choice of the other player 
and strictly less for some choice.) When strategy "d" is included in the dynamical 
system, it unambiguously decreases to zero along non-trivial solution paths. It can 
be shown that  the  limiting behavior of the  full system is then determined by the 
limiting behavior of the two-dimensional system where "d"  and its corresponding 
fraction "x2", say, are simply omitted. 
The following equations obtain in this case: 
XI=2X 1+2x 3+2X 4-  W 
xl 
~_2= 2x~ +3X3+X 4 -- W 
x3 
-- =  2Xi +  4X  3 +  2x4 -  W, 
X4 
where xl, x3,  and  x4,  are  the  fractions of the population  playing strategies  "u", 
"m", and "f"  respectively and where; 
W = x~ (2xl + 2x3 + 2x4) +  x3(2x t +  3X3) +  X4(2X  I + 4X3 + 2X4). 
is the average fitness of the entire population. Using the fact that x~ = (1 -  x3 -  x4) 
to eliminate x~ on the r.h.s., the system can be expressed as; 
El 
-- = --(x3 + x4)x3 <-- 0 
Xi 
x3 
--  X4 +  X3(1-- X3 -- X4) 
X3 
--=  X3+X3(1 -- X3-- X4) ~  0. 
X4 
The phase diagram for this essentially two-dimensional system in x3 and x4, say, is 
represented in Fig. 7. 
All generic solution paths of the dynamical system converge ultimately to a mixture 
of "u"  and  "f", and so have limiting payoff of 2  as  in the usual  equilibrium for 
the original 2 x 2 prisoner's dilemma game. However, each such path takes a detour 
towards the vertex at which the first mutant "m" is the entire population and the 
average fitness is hence 3.  Instead, average fitness at first increases along the path 
but then decreases as the path heads back to a  mixture of "u" and "f". Although 
the indeterminate nature of the mixture involved implies that there exists no ESS, 
that there exists indeed no point attractor, this is a  technicality in that the payoff 
is determinate. Note that this example is clearly non-generic in that small independent 
perturbations of the payoffs in the 4 x 4  matrix here are likely to break the ties in 
the payoffs. However, these ties are produced endogenously by the signaling mutants 
and hence should be treated as ties. EFFICIENCY  IN  EVOLUTIONARY  GAMES  389 




\  \  A,=o 
~=0 
W--5 
FIG. 7.  Phase diagram for reduced form Prisoner's Dilemma with two mutants. 
4.  Related  Works, Implications 
A large number of authors from several disciplines have considered how natural 
selection  might  be  reconciled with  a  variety of altemative  concepts  of altruism. 
Trivers  (1971)  coined  the  term  "reciprocal  altruism"  to  describe  a  process  for 
attaining group efficient outcomes by means which essentially respect the individual 
as the unit of selection. Discussions of altruism, reciprocal or not, have become a 
central concern of sociobiology (see, e.g. Wilson, 1975: 3). 
Within  biology, related kinds  of signaling  mutants  to those  here are discussed 
by  Dawkins  (1982b:  chapter  8).  This  comprises  a  theoretical  discussion  of how 
"outlaw genes" might promote their own survival at the expense of other closely 
related  genes.  Two  of these  hypothetical  outlaw  types  discussed  use  signals  to 
distinguish themselves from other genes. These two types are christened "armpits" 
and  "green beards".  Within  pure  game  theory, a  related  contribution  is  due  to 
Matsui  (1988). He presents an analysis of a two-player infinitely repeated game in 
which only Pareto-efficient outcomes can be equilibria.  It is assumed that there is 
a  small probability that one agent's entire "supergame" strategy is revealed to the 
other. The proof relies on a construction reminiscent of the signaling strategy here. 390  A.J.  ROBSON 
For Matsui,  of course,  the two  players  are  fully rational  human  beings.  Finally, 
many of the  ingredients  used  here can  be  found  in  Binmore  (1988).  He  uses  an 
evolutionary game argument to buttress the utilitarian outcome in a certain situation 
at the expense of the Nash bargaining one. His argument is analogous of that used 
here in section 3.2. to analyze the one-shot prisoner's dilemma. 
The game theoretic issue addressed here arises repeatedly in the previous literature. 
Dawkins (1976: 197-202), for example, outlines a game-theoretic approach to mutual 
grooming.  He finds  two  ESSs with  differing payoffs, thus  fitting the  model  here. 
Axelrod  &  Hamilton  (1981)  and  Axeirod  (1984)  contain  a  detailed  evolutionary 
game theoretic analysis of co-operation (see also Maynard Smith, 1984: chapter 13, 
for a  summary of this).  Much  of this work assumes  that the two individuals  play 
the prisoner's dilemma not once, but repeatedly, and there is some given probability 
of termination at each repetition. In this context, different pure strategies turn out 
to generate ties in payoffs in a  manner which creates difficulties with the notion of 
an ESS as in Definition 2. Boyd (1989), however, shows that pure strategies can be 
reinstated as  ESSs if individuals can make mistakes with certain probabilities.  For 
such a "supergame", indeed, always finking remains an ESS in this extended sense. 
A  modified  version  of the  strategy  "tit-for-tat",  which  co-operates  initially  but 
thereafter matches the opponent's last move, can also be an ESS. If so it will yield 
a group preferred outcome. This model then essentially fits the framework developed 
here. In the original analysis the "evolution of co-operation" was hampered because 
"tit-for-tat" mutants  were at a  disadvantage  playing against  an initial  population 
which  always  finked  relative  to  this  initial  population  itself.  Thus  Axelrod 
(1984: 175), for example, emphasized the need for geographical clustering of these 
mutants  to  provide  a  friendlier  initial  environment  for themselves.  The  present 
analysis suggests how mutants might arise which are not at a disadvantage relative 
to the initial  population, while still obtaining higher payoffs against  one another. 
The "evolution of co-operation" would then by ultimately inevitable. 
Finally, it should be noted that a  full genetic model of the above "secret hand- 
shake"  mutation is  ultimately desirable.  It is  difficult to imagine such a  mutation 
as being likely to arise from a change in a gene at a single locus. It is more plausible, 
perhaps, that the gene controlling an appropriate change in appearance is  at one 
locus  and  that  controlling  the  recognition  of this  change  is  at  another.  Sexual 
reproduction is generally believed to facilitate such compound mutations. However, 
the full implications of genetic recombination for the "secret handshake" mutation 
are not clear. 
I am indebted to Robert Axelrod, W. G. S. Hines, John Maynard Smith, Eric van Damme 
and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 
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APPENDIX  General Case 
As a  matter of notation: 
Definition  5.  Support,  best-replies 
Consider an evolutionary game as in Definition  1. Suppose x E A "-~, then define; 
R(x)={i~{1  .....  n}lx~ >  0} = support  ofx 
and 
S(x)  = {i ~ {1 ....  , n}t (Ax), -- max (Ax)j} 
J 
-- set of pure strategy best-replies to x. 
Clearly, if x*  is an  ESS as in  Definition 2,  R(x*) c  S(x*). 
Suppose the following holds: 
Assumption  1  two EESs 
Consider  an  evolutionary  game  as  in  Definition  1  with  a  non-zero  number  of 
ESSs as in  Definition 2.  (This number  must be finite. See van  Damme,  1987: 214). 
Take p  to be any ESS which yields the maximum over ESSs of average fitness, and 
suppose further that there is an  ESS q  with  strictly lower average fitness: 
qTAq <prAp. 
It  is  intended,  then,  to  introduce  plausible  mutant(s)  which  destroy  any  such 
inefficient  q  as  an  ESS.  The  simplest  way  of doing  this  might  be  to  introduce  a 
single monomorphic  mutant  which  played the  ESS  q,  as a  mixed strategy, against 
the  old  non-signaling  population  but  played the  ESS p,  also as  a  mixed strategy, 
against fellow signalers. This would undoubtedly achieve the desired result. Indeed, 392  A.J.  ROBSON 
if the ESS q  had previously been achieved by a  monomorphic population playing 
it as a mixed strategy, it seems reasonable that a  mutant could also use this mixed 
strategy against non-signalers. What seems less plausible is that the mutant would 
immediately stumble upon the exact mixed strategy, p, to be used in attaining the 
new ESS. It is perhaps more plausible to hypothesize instead the introduction of a 
number of mutants, each of which chooses a pure strategy against fellow signalers: 
Assumption  2 form of mutants 
Suppose the evolutionary game given in Definition 1 is augmented by the introduc- 
tion of n signaling mutants. Mutant i plays the pure strategy i against fellow signalers, 
i =  1,...,  n. Against non-signaling players, however, every mutant plays the inferior 
ESS q, as a  mixed strategy. 
Remark: 
It is easy to see, given the proof below, that the number of mutants can be reduced 
to IR(p)l, that is, the number of elements in the support of p. 
The effect of Assumption  2  is to convert the original game,  represented by the 
matrix A, as in Definition  1, into the game represented by the augmented matrix; 
2nx2n 
Now B = (bil) where; 
bi~ = payoff to old strategy i against mutant  l 
=  ~.  a/jqj = (Aq)i = hi,  say. 
j=l 
Furthermore, C = (Ckj) where; 
Ckj = payoff to mutant k  against old strategy j 
=  ~  aijqi = (qTA)j = cj,  say. 
i=l 
Finally, D  = (dg~) where; 
dkt = payoff tO mutant k  against  mutant  l 
Hence; 
akl. 
A  b  -..  b]., 
C T 
A 
c  ¥ 
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The main result now follows in a  purely formal fashion from Definition 2. The 
interpretation  intended is given below. Thus: 
Theorem 1:  Elimination of an inferior ESS 
Suppose  an  evolutionary game is described by A  as above, where Definition  1 
applies to A. Now [qr, O  r] is not an ESS of ,~. However, both [pr, O  r ] and [O r, pr] 
are ESSs of ~, (ESSs are as in Definition 2). 
Proof: 
As purely a  matter of notation, 2n-vectors z, say z• A  2~-~ will be written, in this 
proof, as [arr, (1 -  a)s r] where r, s e A  "-1, a  ~ [0, 1]. 
(a)  [qr, 0 T] is not an ESS of A.  Note that; 
[0r,pr],~[ q]=[cr,prA][0  ]=crq=qrAq=[qr,O]A[q]. 
That is, the mutant [O r, pr]  does exactly as well against [qr, O  r]  as [qr, O  r] does. 
Further; 
whereas; 
[qr, 0],~[~] =[qr, o][ bp] =q rb=q r Aq< pr Ap 
by Assumption  1. Thus  the mutant [O r, pT]  does better against  itself than  [qr,0] 
does against this mutant.  Hence [qr, 0] is not an ESS of ,~. 
(b)  [pr, 0 T] is an ESS of ,~. Note that firstly since p  and q  are both ESSs of A, 
qrAp <prAp, 
that is, q  cannot be a best-reply to p. For suppose; 
qTAp =p'rAp. 
Then since p  is an ESS, 
qTAq<prAq, 
which contradicts q  being an  ESS.  (This result is implied by Bishop & Cannings, 
1978: 91.)  Hence, Vs • A "-~ 
[or, sr]  uj  0 
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since p  is an  ESS of A. Altogether,  then,  Va •  [0, 1] 
and equality is only possible if a  =  1. In this case, then, 
rrAp = p rAp. 
Since p  is an  ESS of A 
so that; 
rr Ar < p r Ar, 
] 
exactly as required  in order that [pr  O  r]  be an  ESS of ,~. 
(c)  [0~p r] is also an  ESS of ,TL Note that,  of course, 
Now Vr, s • A "-1 and  ~ •  [0, 1], 
[~tr r, (1-a)sr]~t  [~]  =arrb+(1-ct)srAp=ctr'rAq+(1-a)sTAp, 
where, 
r rAq <_ q rAq < p rap, 
since q  is an  ESS of A and by Assumption  1.  Further; 
srAp<_prAp, 
since p  is an  ESS of A.  Hence; 
arr Aq+(1 -a)sr Ap<_pT-Ap, 
with equality implying  a  = 0.  In this case, then, 
srAp = prAp, 
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Interpretation 
The form of the mutants given above was motivated by considering a monomorphic 
population playing the old ESS, q. The above result concerning the ESSs of .~ also 
is best interpreted as considering the introduction of monomorphic mutants which 
mix over all 2n of the strategies involved in the construction of A. This suggests a 
motive for analyzing the appropriate mixed strategy dynamical system. For simplicity 
of exposition, however, only the pure strategy dynamic is studied here. 
Remarks 
(1)  Perhaps not every monomorphic mixed strategy mutant as above is actually 
possible. For example, it would not be possible for an individual to mix over 
possession of the signal, if this were a  permanent change in appearance. Of 
course, being an ESS will still suffice to deter invasion by any of the remaining 
mutants. 
(2)  On  the  other hand, there  are  mutants which are  not considered here.  For 
example, take the class of mutants which do not possess the signal but which 
condition their behavior on  its  presence  in an opponent.  It is  not claimed 
that the present result is robust to the exact specification of the mutants. 
(3)  It is readily checked that the above result is, to some extent, robust to the 
mixed strategy played by mutants against non-signalers. That is, if mutants 
use  ~  for this, where  R(~)c S(q),  as in  Definition 5,  and  ~  is sufficiently 
close to q, then the Theorem remains true. 
Consider, then, the pure strategy dynamic, as in Definition 3, for the matrix ,~. 
Note, indeed, that the coordination game of section 3.1 has the property that points 
near the old inefficient ESS are attracted to the new "secret handshake" ESS. This 
does not follow from Theorem 1. However, the following generalization applies: 
Theorem 2:  Pure strategy dynamics of augmented  game 
Suppose the evolutionary game is given by ,4 as above. Consider the pure-strategy 
dynamical system as in Definition 3. Now [qr, O  r] is not even an attractor for there 
is  a  path  from  [qr,0 r]  leading  to  [0r,p r]  in  this  dynamical  system.  Indeed, 
convergence to [Or, pr]  is guaranteed if the initial point is sufficiently close to this 
path. 
Proof: 
It is convenient now to write a 2n-vector z e A  "-~ in the form [x r, yr], for suitable 
x, y ~ R n÷. Now each component x~ of the vector x refers to the number of individuals 
playing the old pure strategy i against all comers. Each component Yi refers to the 
number of signaling mutants playing pure strategy i against fellow signalers, where 
all such mutants play the ESS q  as a  mixed strategy against non-signalers. 
Suppose the initial point is given on the straight line between [qr, O  r ] and [O r, pr] 
as: 
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It is to be shown that the solution path of the dynamical system remains on this 
line and converges to [0 T, pT]. Now the payoff to the old strategy i is (Aq)i because 
all other strategies play q  against the old population. The payoff to mutant j  is; 
txq rAq + (1 -  a )(Ap)j, 
because it obtains the ESS payoff for q a fraction a  of the time and pIays the mutant 
population p the remaining fraction of the time. Hence the average payoff overall is; 
ot(qT Aq)+(1-tx)[otqT Aq+(1-ot)pr  Ap]=a(2-a)q  T Aq+(1-a)2pZ  Ap. 
It follows that the pure strategy dynamic for [xr, yr], as in Definition 3, is given by; 
-- = q T Aq -- ot (2-- a)q TAq -  (1 -- a)2p TAp = _(1 -- a)2[ p rap _ q T  Aq ] < O, 
xl 
for all i c R(q). If i ~ R(q) then, of course, xl = 0. Thus the components of x  shrink 
at the same percentage rate, given such an initial point. Similarly, 
= txqTAq + (1 -  a)pTAp -- ct(2 -- a)qrAq -  (1 -  a)2prAp 
Ys 
= c~(1 -  c~)[prAp -  qTAq] > O, 
for allj ~ R (p). If j ~ R (p) then yj -  0. Hence it is also true that the components of 
y remain in fixed proportions, given the initial point. Clearly the solution is given by; 
x(t)=a(t)q  y(t)=[1-a(t)]p, 
where, 
~/(t) 
= -(1 -  c~(t))2[pTAp -- qrAq] < O, 
~(t) 
and a(0)= a. It follows that a(t)-->O as  t-->  oo, that is, 
[xT(t), yr(t)]--> [0, p T], 
no matter how close a(0) =  a  was initially to 1, as was to be shown. 
The ESS of ,~, [O r, pr], must be an attractor in this dynamical system. Its "basin 
of attraction" is then an open set which includes the above path (see Zeeman, 1979). 
That is, ultimate convergence to [O  r, pT] is guaranteed if the initial point is sufficiently 
dose to the above path.  Of course such a  result says little about the behavior of 
paths which start far from this particular path. 